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Abstract Recent decades have seen a shift in the management and discussion of biomedicine.
Issues once considered by doctors and scientists are now handled by a diverse array of participants,
including philosophers, lawyers, theologians and lay representatives. This new approach, known as
‘bioethics’, has become the norm in regulatory committees and public debate. In this article, I argue
that bioethics emerged as a valued enterprise in Britain during the 1980s because it fulfilled, and
linked, the concerns of several groups. My analysis centres on the moral philosopher Mary Warnock,
who chaired a government inquiry into human fertilization and embryology between 1982 and
1984, and became a strong advocate of bioethics. I detail how Warnock’s promotion of bioethics
tallied with the Conservative government’s desire for increased surveillance of hitherto autonomous
professions – while fulfilling her own belief that philosophers should engage in public affairs. And I
also show that Warnock simultaneously promoted bioethics to doctors and scientists as an essential
safeguard against declining political and public trust. This stance, I argue, framed bioethics as a vital
intermediary between politics, the public, and biomedicine, and explains the growth and endurance
of what the Guardian identified as an ethics industry.
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Recent decades have witnessed significant changes in the management of medical and
scientific ethics. In Britain and worldwide, members of several professions consider
contentious issues that were traditionally the preserve of doctors or scientists. In government
committees and ethical review boards, best practice is now determined by a diverse array of
actors: including philosophers, lawyers, doctors, scientists, health-care managers, theolo-
gians, social scientists, and representatives of patient and charitable groups. Instruction
in ethics, once a matter of professional etiquette, takes place on dedicated courses, with
emphasis on law and moral philosophy. A growing body of interdisciplinary journals
discusses problems that were previously encountered in the correspondence pages of the
Lancet or the British Medical Journal. And in media discussion of biomedical research and
clinical practice, the relevant ethical issues are now more likely to be highlighted and
discussed by philosophers and lawyers than by doctors or scientists.
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Bioethics was first coined in 1970 by the American biochemist Van Rensselaer Potter.
However, this designated an approach that is not familiar to us today. For Potter, ‘bioethics’
involved a system of humanist ethics derived from biology and medicine – a ‘science for
survival’ (Potter, 1970). Quite independently, only months later, the philosophers Andre
Helleger and Sargent Shriver used the same term to name a new Institute for the Study of
Human Reproduction and Bioethics at Georgetown University, a private Jesuit institution in
Washington DC. Helleger and Sargent’s definition is the one we recognize. To them,
‘bioethics’ constituted the examination of biomedicine by people outside its professional
confines (Cooter, 2004). As Stevens has outlined, it quickly became the label for growing
external scrutiny of science and medicine, with philosophers, lawyers and theologians
serving on federal commissions and working in dedicated centres for bioethics (Stevens,
2000). Few would deny that this new configuration has had a sizeable impact on public and
political life in the past 30 years. As Rose details, in regulatory commissions, national and
international committees, and in the public discussion of professional practices, we have
‘witnessed a bioethical encirclement of biomedical science and clinical practice’ (2007,
p. 30). And this, as Salter argues, represents a fundamental shift in the location and exercise
of biopower: with new actors determining the development of policies and biomedical
technologies that, in turn, play a crucial role in governing the health of individuals and
populations (2004).
Bioethics appears to be a rich subject for historical investigation: revealing new regulatory
strategies, changing relations between professions and new notions of ethical expertise. But
our understanding of its emergence remains sketchy. As Cooter and Rosenberg detail,
most historical accounts have been written by bioethicists themselves (Rosenberg, 1999;
Cooter, 2000). These adhere to an explanatory framework one sociologist has recently
called the ‘origin myth’ model (Armstrong, 2007). They claim that scholars in several
fields, enthused by 1960s civil rights and countercultural politics, increasingly began to
take an interest in issues that had previously been monopolized by doctors and scientists;
and they present bioethicists as oppositional critics of the biomedical establishment –
responding to unprecedented ethical dilemmas on behalf of patients and society, and reviving
disciplines like moral philosophy in the process (for example, Toulmin, 1982; Jonsen, 1998;
Harris, 2001).
These celebratory narratives have not gone unchallenged. In recent years, several
anthropologists, sociologists and medical historians have criticized bioethics. These
dissenting voices roughly fall into two camps. Some critique bioethics for an overriding
reliance on formalistic philosophical principles that, they claim, are divorced from the
expectations of the patients it claims to represent. These critiques do not challenge bioethics
in and of itself, but argue it would be better served by adopting ethnographic, sociological
or historical perspectives (for example, Kleinman, 1999; Belkin, 2004; Lopez, 2004).
Others, meanwhile, attack the bioethical enterprise itself: claiming that instead of pro-
viding a challenge to biomedicine and acting on behalf of patients, it serves to insulate
science and medicine from threatening questions about new technologies and, through an
increasingly bureaucratic process, provides ‘ethical warrants’ that allow research to proceed
(Rosenberg, 1999; Stevens, 2000; Evans, 2002). To Francis Fukuyama, ‘bioethicists have
become nothing more than sophisticated (and sophistic) justifiers of whatever it is the
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Kantian metaphysics to beat back criticisms by anyone y who might object strenuously’
(2002, p. 204).
But both forms of critique regularly fail to identify the broad assumptions and
mechanisms that underpinned the emergence and growth of bioethics in particular times
and places. As Ashcroft claims, a more interesting and challenging analysis would begin by
posing the question: ‘if bioethics is the answer, what was the question?’ (2004, p. 158).
This, he follows, would then allow us to investigate precisely what interests were served, and
linked, by external arbitration of biomedicine and, likewise, to identify the various parties
who stood to benefit from the development of particular answers. Seeking to answer
these questions through self-serving ‘origin myths’ will not suffice. For one, we cannot
simply explain the growth of bioethics by pointing to the inherently controversial nature
of new technologies or practices. Issues such as animal experimentation, reproductive
medicine and human experimentation caused discord well before the 1970s, but did
not necessitate outside arbitration. In other words, the ‘bioethical’ aspects of particular
practices and objects were not self-evident, but were the product of specific socio-political
contexts and professional agendas in the late twentieth century (Cooter, 2000). But,
additionally, when looking to the broader factors that made specific issues ‘bioethical’,
we cannot fall back on references to countercultural and civil rights politics. Although they
may partly account for the growth of bioethics in America, they cannot account for its
emergence elsewhere.
This is certainly the case in Britain. Here, ‘bioethics’ was considered an American
neologism during the 1970s, and doctors and scientists continued to control professional
ethics and decision making (Cooter, 2004). Bioethics did not gain currency – either as a term
or an approach – until the 1980s, when philosophers and lawyers became actively involved
in the public discussion and, crucially, the regulation of biomedicine. It soon proved
pervasive. By 1990, Britain had a dedicated bioethics council, prompting the Guardian to
talk of an ‘ethics industry’, and its growing band of external arbiters had become respected
public and political figures (Anon, 1991a).
This article investigates the broad factors that created the demand for outside involvement
with science and medicine in Britain, and charts how particular individuals fashioned
themselves into ‘bioethical’ experts. My analysis centres on the moral philosopher Mary
Warnock, who was appointed chair of a government inquiry into human fertilization and
embryology in 1982, and went on, as Jasanoff notes, to become ‘synonymous with British
bioethics’ (2005, p. 152). Although Hedgecoe has rightly argued that we should avoid
focusing on critical events and notable figures in the history of bioethics, as it carries the
danger of recapitulating ‘origin myths’, I believe that studying the debate that preceded
Warnock’s appointment, and her subsequent discussion of reproductive medicine, provides
an excellent window onto the interplay between professional actions and socio-political
concerns that fostered the growth of the British ‘ethics industry’ (Hedgecoe, 2009). As we
shall see, Warnock’s selection as chair of the government inquiry came amidst, and reflected,
growing calls for external oversight of science and medicine that dovetailed with the
incumbent Conservative government’s desire to make professions accountable to newly
empowered end-users – be they patients, parents or shareholders (Rose, 1993, 1999; Power,
1997; Strathern, 2000). Through an analysis of official papers, I show that officials at the
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their inquiry. This task, as we shall see, presented Warnock with the chance to fulfil her long-
standing ambition of applying philosophy to practical affairs. What is more, she used her
position as chair to publicly endorse greater oversight of science and medicine, arguing the
public were ‘entitled to know, and even to control’ professional practices (1985a, p. xiii).
With this in mind, and by charting how the lawyer Ian Kennedy led calls for appointment of
an ‘outside’ chair in the first place, I claim that we need to be attuned to the central role that
putative bioethicists played in generating and harnessing the demand for bioethics in Britain,
as much as they reacted to it.
But, crucially, I also show that Warnock did not present external oversight as opposed to
biomedical interests. She instead promised researchers it would confer legitimacy on their
work, by proving to politicians and the public that it could proceed ‘without being put to
morally intolerable uses’ (1988a, p. 1627). Many clinicians and researchers agreed: believing
new oversight regimes would make their research ‘socially palatable’, and supporting
Warnock’s call for a national bioethics council (Anon, 1983b). I argue that Warnock’s
importance lay in the way she presented external arbitration as an essential intermediary
between the political demand for accountability and the professional desire for legitimacy.
This historical analysis strengthens the view that we can explain the demand for bioethics by
seeing it, to quote Rose, as ‘a necessary supplement to the imperatives of political
decision making concerning the life sciences’: which claims to represent the public interest,
while simultaneously legitimating biomedical research (Salter and Jones, 2005; Rose,
2007, p. 30).
Mary Warnock, Practical Philosophy and ‘Test-Tube Babies’
Mary Wilson was born in Winchester on 14 April 1924, 7 months after her father died from
diphtheria. Despite being one of six children in a single parent family, the young Mary
enjoyed a comfortable childhood. Her family remained wealthy thanks to her maternal
grandfather, a German-born banker, and she was educated at the prestigious St Swithin’s
School in Winchester (Warnock, 2000). After leaving this school in 1940, she spent three
terms at St Prior’s School in Surrey, which was founded by the Huxley family and counted
Julian and Aldous Huxley among its former pupils. In 1942 she won a scholarship to Lady
Margaret Hall, Oxford, to study Classics. It was here that she met a fellow student, Geoffrey
Warnock, who went on to become a renowned philosopher and Vice-Chancellor of Oxford.
In 1949 they married, and the same year the new Mrs Warnock was appointed lecturer in
moral philosophy at St Hugh’s College, Oxford.
While Mary Wilson was growing up in interwar Britain, the ‘test-tube baby’ that later
brought her to public attention featured in debates on population health, eugenics and
industrial culture. In his 1924 essay Daedalus, or Science and the Future, the geneticist
J.B.S. Haldane predicted that advances in tissue culture techniques would soon underpin
the fertilization and growth of human embryos in laboratories, a process he termed
‘ectogenesis’. Haldane predicted that by late twentieth century few children would be ‘born
of woman’, and that ectogenesis would overcome biological degeneration by permitting
selection of embryos that were ‘undoubtedly superior to the average’ (1924, p. 64). Reviews
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tissue culture is remembered’ (Anon, 1924, p. 740). And biologists who cultured mammalian
embryos, such as Thomas Strangeways, publicly stated the idea of the ‘test-tube baby’ is not
inherently impossible (Strangeways, 1926).
1 At the same time, however, others presented test
tube babies as symbols of subordination in modern industrial culture. Aldous Huxley’s Brave
New World, for one, envisaged a dystopian future where ectogenesis displaced humans
from reproduction, with dehumanized clones mass-produced on production lines like Henry
Ford’s Model-T (Wilson, 2005).
Although the social implications of ectogenesis, and science in general, were publicly
discussed during the 1920s and 1930s, philosophers were absent from these debates. The
only one who seemed engaged with these concerns was the analytic philosopher Bertrand
Russell, who warned of the harmful union between science and authoritarian politics in
Icarus (1924) and The Scientific Outlook (1931), and who wrote on a range of political
and moral issues into the 1960s. But Russell, tellingly, did not consider these books to be
philosophy. Partly owing to his horror at the First World War, when the Germans and the
British appealed to incommensurate notions of a just cause, and partly owing to efforts to
endow philosophy with the same objective stance as the sciences, he claimed that moral
judgements should be regarded as non-verifiable expressions of attitude that fell outside the
domain of philosophy (Pigden, 2003). The belief that moral statements were subjective
displays of emotion – no more objective than hissing or handclapping – underpinned an
austere view of philosophy that lasted until the 1970s.
2 Following Russell, influential
philosophers like Ludwig Wittgenstein, Alfred Ayer and Charles Stevenson ignored
substantive issues and occupied themselves with meta-ethical investigation of what counted
as a ‘moral’ judgement. In 1954, Ayer claimed that people should not look to moral
philosophers for practical guidance, as all they could properly demonstrate was that moral
statements were ‘expressions of attitude and not statements of fact, and consequently that
they cannot be true or false’ (1954, p. 246).
This standpoint clearly irked Mary Warnock. In a 1960 book on ethics, she complained
that moral philosophy ‘as a serious subject has been left further and further behind’ by the
‘the refusal of philosophers in England to commit themselves to any moral opinions’ (1960,
p. 203). Disaffected with the state of her subject, and having decided that she was an
‘entirely unoriginal thinker’, Warnock took the position of headmistress at the private
Oxford School for Girls in 1966 (Warnock, 2004, p. 14). When she returned to academia in
the mid-1970s she was more optimistic, declaring in a new book on ethics that ‘the most
1 Strangeways’s statement predates the first recorded use of the term ‘test-tube baby’ by nearly 10 years. As it
stands, the Oxford English Dictionary assigns its origins to a 1935 United States debate on artificial
insemination.
2 Russell considered his books on science, politics and the morality of issues like marriage to be unphilosophic
moralizing, written as ‘as a human being who suffered from the state of the world [and] wished to find some
way of improving ity anxious to speak in plain terms to others who had similar feelings’ (Russell, cited in
Pigden, 2003, p. 481). Subjected to his emotivist criteria, they represented his subjective position on
particular issues and, logically, were not philosophy. Nevertheless, philosophers have since claimed these
books do represent important contributions to moral philosophy – ‘no worse y than the moral and
political writing of, say, Sartre, Nietzsche, or Voltaire’ (ibid, p. 476). The bioethicist John Harris identifies
Russell’s later critiques of nuclear weapons, and especially his 1961 book Has Man a Future?, as a major
factor in encouraging a new generation of philosophers to engage with practical issues. See Harris (2001).
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and therefore more urgent and interesting’ (1978, p. 139). Warnock’s newfound confidence
reflected that philosophers on both sides of the Atlantic had begun to discuss practical issues:
motivated partly by radicalized students who wanted to discuss the rights and wrongs of the
Vietnam War – not issues of meta-ethics (O’Neill, 2009; Warnock, 2009). Warnock had
recently been presented with the chance to engage with practical affairs herself. In 1972, she
was appointed to a committee of inquiry into regulation of the medical profession, chaired
by the physicist Alec Merrison. And in 1974, she was appointed chair of an inquiry
into special education by Margaret Thatcher, then secretary of state for Education. This
committee issued its report in 1978, and its recommendations were central to the
Conservative’s 1981 Education Act.
In the United States, the philosophical engagement with substantive issues extended to an
active role in the regulation of biomedicine. In 1972, the New York Times reported that
researchers investigating the natural history of syphilis had intentionally withheld treatment
from 400 African Americans with the disease in Tuskegee, Alabama, since 1932. In 1974,
in response to the Tuskegee study and other controversies, including the disclosure of
non-consented research on institutionalized children, President Nixon established a National
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects in Biomedical and Behavioural Research
(Fox and Swazey, 2008). The Act that established the Commission stipulated that no more
than five of its 11 members should be scientists or doctors – with the majority to be chosen
from philosophy, law, sociology, theology, government and the general public. Several of
these ‘outside’ members, including the British-born philosopher Stephen Toulmin, went on
to become prominent authorities on scientific and medical ethics. And this, as Rothman
remarks, ‘made apparent that the monopoly of the medical profession in medical ethics was
over’ (1990, p. 189).
The situation in Britain, however, differed markedly. Here research practices were also
called into question, following the 1967 publication of Maurice Pappworth’s Human
Guinea Pigs; but in contrast to the United States the regulation of clinical or basic research
was not redefined as a matter that required external input (Ashcroft and Dixon-Woods,
2008, p. 382). Evoking the emphasis on clinical autonomy struck as part of the 1948
settlement that created the NHS, prominent doctors successfully argued that legal
and ethical responsibility should remain ‘firmly on the shoulders of the medical profession’
(Hedgecoe, 2009, p. 338). Although growing numbers of hospitals formed research ethics
committees in the late 1960s and 1970s, only one-fifth of the committees surveyed
in 1972 contained a non-medical member (ibid.). And Merrison’s inquiry on medical
regulation endorsed this state of affairs: arguing that since ‘it is the essence of professional
skill that it deals with matters unfamiliar to the layman’, the public would be best
served by a regulatory body composed predominantly of doctors (Anon, 1975, p. 188).
When scrutiny and criticism of professional actions arose, it came from within science
and medicine: from the student doctors who ran regional Medical Groups, or leftist
scientists in the British Society for Social Responsibility in Science (Whong-Barr, 2003;
Werskey, 2007). Those philosophers and theologians who began to engage with ethical
issues in this period – such as Alistair Campbell, Raymond Plant or Robin Downie – did not
challenge professional paternalism and had no say in the regulatory process. Their role
instead lay in teaching ethics to doctors, nurses and social workers: helping improve
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2009).
The re-emergence of ‘test-tube babies’ encapsulated the differences between Britain and
the United States in this period. In February 1969, the Cambridge physiologists Robert
Edwards and Barry Bavister, and the Oldham obstetrician Patrick Steptoe, announced the
first in vitro fertilization (henceforth IVF) and maturation of human oocytes (Edwards et al,
1969). Yet despite the growing scrutiny of basic and clinical research, IVF was not
considered problematic in Britain during the 1970s. Media unease only peaked briefly after
Edwards et al’s 1969 announcement, with newspapers predicting that communist states
would use the technique to clone armies of ‘supermen’ (Turney, 1997). In 1972, the biologist
Steven Rose, founding member of the British Society for Social Responsibility in Science,
argued that discussion of IVF diverted attention from the more pressing issues in medical
ethics, such as the ‘sharp disparities in the application of medical care’ between social classes
(Anon, 1972, p. 342). Indeed, IVF was not even considered the most problematic
reproductive technique in this period. Attendees of a 1973 symposium agreed it would raise
fewer ethical and legal problems than artificial insemination by donor (henceforth AID),
because it did not involve a third party and did not raise questions surrounding paternity and
anonymity (Wolstenholme and Fitzsimmons, 1973).
The only ‘outsider’ who discussed the ethics of IVF in any detail was the theologian
Gordon Dunstan. In his 1974 book The Artifice of Ethics, Dunstan argued the overriding
ethical priority in IVF involved ensuring that sperm and egg were brought together
responsibly in vitro; but he held this duty should also underpin AID, as well the actions of
couples looking to conceive naturally (Dunstan, 1974). What was more, Dunstan saw no
problem with the possible uses that could be made of in vitro embryos – including
experimentation. He claimed experiments on embryos were vital ‘for research into recesses
otherwise inaccessible y to study embryonic growth, for instance, with a view to detecting
the origin of disorders and to find, perhaps, the means to correct or prevent them’ (ibid,
p. 67). In the absence of any sustained critique, Robert Edwards commanded the ethical
discussion of IVF himself. In public lectures and journal articles, he claimed that an infertile
couple’s right to have children outweighed any potential objection. ‘Fertilization in vitro
followed by reimplantation into the mother does not pose any moral problems’, he argued,
‘and the right of couples to have their own children should not be challenged’ (1974, p. 16).
When Louise Brown, the first ‘test-tube baby’, was born in Greater Manchester during
July 1978, the Guardian commented on the absence of ‘moral or ethical outrage’ (Tucker,
1978, p. 11). Press coverage was overwhelmingly positive: greeting the ‘Baby of the Century’
and claiming IVF provided hope to thousands of infertile couples (Turney, 1997). As the
British Medical Journal detailed, this differed from the United States, where the major
question was ‘not whether the baby would be a boy or girl but whether its presumably
unprecedented manner of coming into being is ethical’ (Culliton and Waterfall, 1978,
p. 1270). The contrast was notably held as evidence of a distinctly American phenomenon:
the flowering of bioethics. The British Medical Journal reported that American politicians
increasingly based federal policy on the opinions of theologians, philosophers and lawyers –
who acted ‘as society’s conscience in matters once left entirely to the medical profession’
(ibid.). And the strident opinions of some bioethicists, as well as a politically active pro-life
lobby, ensured American attitudes to IVF were far more critical. The Princeton theologian
Creating the ‘ethics industry’
127 r 2011 The London School of Economics and Political Science 1745-8552 BioSocieties Vol. 6, 2, 121–141Paul Ramsey, for one, urged Congress that it ‘should not be allowed by medical or public
policy in the United States – not now, nor ever’ (ibid.).
‘We Must ALL Have a Say on Test Tube Babies’: Promoting External
Oversight in the 1980s
But the British enthusiasm for IVF soon dissipated. By the early 1980s, newspapers claimed
the procedure raised social and moral dilemmas that the Daily Express collectively termed
‘the aberrations of the baby revolution’: including the implantation of multiple embryos in
one cycle, the use of IVF by unmarried couples, the prospect of commercial surrogacy and
experimentation on embryos in vitro (Hadley, 1984, p. 10). The Daily Mail, which had
welcomed the birth of Louise Brown, withdrew the money it pledged for the clinic Edwards
and Steptoe were building at Bourne Hall, Cambridge (Warnock, 2004, p. 74). And political
figures, such as the Conservative Peer Lord Campbell, warned that IVF would ‘imperil the
dignity of the human race, threaten the welfare of children, and destroy the sanctity of family
life’ (Campbell, 1982, p. 1001).
Michael Mulkay argues this criticism can be explained by the ‘socio-political’ changes that
followed the 1979 election of Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative Party (Mulkay, 1997).
Members of the new government regularly stressed the need to reaffirm social principles
undermined by the ‘permissive’ Bills on homosexuality, abortion and capital punishment
that Harold Wilson’s Labour government passed during the 1960s. Their emphasis on
‘traditional’ morals, Mulkay claims, gave influence to pro-life organizations such as LIFE
and the Society for the Protection of the Unborn Child, which remained marginal during the
1970s. Accorded a greater political and media profile, these groups helped problematize
issues that were hitherto uncontroversial. For instance, during a television interview in
February 1982, Robert Edwards admitted to experimenting on embryos he had no intention
of implanting into patients and claimed that ‘these spare embryos can be very useful y they
can teach us things about early human life’ (Williams and Stevens, 1982, p. 314). Whereas
Edwards and Gordon Dunstan had both endorsed embryo experimentation during the
1970s – with little resistance – LIFE now led calls for Edwards to be immediately prosecuted
for ‘manipulation of life on a horrifying scale’ (Reynolds and Badford, 1982, p. 7).
Indicating how opinion had swung against IVF, a grave editorial in The Times also stated
that human embryos ‘ought not to be regarded as dispensable matter’, and called for an
urgent debate on ‘which of the many strange possibilities now opening up are acceptable,
which need controls, and which are unacceptable’ (Anon, 1982b).
Yet the emphasis on traditional morals only partly explains why IVF became contentious
in the 1980s. Criticism of the procedure also reflected, and helped instantiate, a growing
distrust of biomedical self-regulation: with several figures in Parliament and the media
calling for new regimes of external oversight. Crucially, many of these demands emanated
from lawyers who began to challenge the current state of medical ethics in Britain – calling
for new modes of scrutiny and regulatory arrangements they termed ‘bioethics’. Foremost
among these new critics was Ian Kennedy, founder of the Centre for Medical Law and Ethics
at King’s College, London. In his 1980 BBC Reith Lectures, Unmasking Medicine, Kennedy
launched a stinging attack on biomedical paternalism. He claimed the increasing discussion
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continued to exclude patients and those in other professions (Kennedy, 1981a, p. 119). As a
solution, he argued medical practices should come under increasing scrutiny from outsiders,
as ‘it could be said that that it is only somebody who is free from any claims which medical
professional loyalty may make on his objectivity who can successfully examine the
institution of medicine’ (ibid, p. viii). This scrutiny, Kennedy recommended, should involve
‘ethics and law, together with sprinklings of philosophy, sociology, and politics’ (ibid.).
While he admitted that ‘here in the United Kingdom we do not have a label’ for the new
approach, he noted it was known as ‘bioethics’ in the United States.
Although Kennedy found the term bioethics ‘unappealing’, he quickly became a firm
advocate of increased oversight of science and medicine (ibid.). During 1981, in the Journal
of Medical Ethics and a BBC documentary, he urged the government to form outside
‘inspectorates’ and argued that: ‘If a profession by definition exists to serve the public
interest, then clearly it must ultimately be the public who judge what that interest is and
whether it is being served’ (Kennedy, 1981b, p. 206). By 1983, in a review of Kennedy’s
television series The Doctor’s Dilemma, the Lancet remarked that his calls for external
oversight had quickly become ‘ubiquitous’ (Anon, 1983a, p. 1026). And in 1984, Raanan
Gillon, editor of the Journal of Medical Ethics, placed Kennedy at the forefront of a
campaign that marked the end of ‘medicine’s halcyon days when doctors – for the most part
only very senior doctors – discussed the dilemmas of medical ethics in privacy and leisure’
(1984, p. 16).
IVF was one of several issues Kennedy highlighted in Unmasking Medicine, alongside care
of the disabled and terminally ill, genetic counselling, provision of health care, and
disclosure of information to patients. But it soon became the main focus of calls for external
oversight. Responding to the growing criticism of embryo experiments in 1982, Kennedy
wrote in The Times that discussion of IVF needed to be ‘dragged into the open’ and ‘cannot
be simply left to one professional group’ (1982, p. 17). Another lawyer, Geoffrey Robertson,
endorsed this in the Observer, claiming IVF raised issues too profound to be handled ‘behind
a closed door marked “Medical Ethics – laymen and lawyers keep out”’ (1982, p. 8).
Robertson argued that the only way to resolve these ‘dilemmas of bioethics’ was through
‘interdisciplinary co-operation and insistence on public participation’ (ibid.). This struck a
chord with the Labour MP Leo Abse, who claimed that inquiries recently established by the
Medical Research Council (MRC), the British Medical Association, and the Royal College of
Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, were insufficient as IVF raised issues ‘too enormous to be
left to doctors’. The only adequate solution, he argued in Parliament, was to convene an
‘inter-departmental and inter-disciplinary inquiry’ (Anon, 1982a, p. 2).
These demands tallied with a Conservative enthusiasm for increased surveillance and
regulation of professional actions. Drawing on neo-liberal theorists such as Friedrich von
Hayek and William Niskanen, who argued that welfare states had allowed professions to
become overly bureaucratic and self-serving, members of Thatcher’s government sought, in
the words of Nigel Lawson, to ‘break from the predominantly social democratic assump-
tions that have hitherto underlain policy in post-war Britain’ by exposing many professions
and public services to ‘the disciplines of the market’ (1980, pp. 6–7). They promoted
increased scrutiny, the adoption of performance indicators and greater competition as
ways of making professions accountable to the demands of parents, patients, citizens and
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the 1980s, this fostered the development of what Michael Power labels the audit society.
Across professions such as teaching, social services, local government, the financial sector
and medicine, reliance on insider knowledge gave way to mechanisms of external oversight
that promised to enforce transparency and public accountability (Jacob, 1991; Bartlett,
2000; Salter, 2000; Munro, 2004; Lowe, 2007). And in line with the Conservative
commitment to what Lawson called ‘rolling back the frontiers of the State’, this oversight
was not performed directly by the government, but was entrusted to an array of outside
consultants and agencies who acted as proxies for consumer interests (Lawson, 1980, p. 5;
Rose, 1993; Power, 1997).
The government’s committee of inquiry into human fertilization and embryology,
announced in July 1982, can be seen as both an enactment of this governmental ethos
and the broader critiques of biomedical paternalism. As correspondence from the Depart-
ment of Education and Science to the MRC indicates, ministers elected to form an inquiry as
they did not consider any of the existing professional inquiries to be ‘sufficiently broadly
based or sufficiently representative’ of public opinion (Norton, 1982). By contrast, ministers
wanted their committee to include representatives from several professions, with members
having diverse religious backgrounds.
The immediate priority, however, was to appoint what civil servants termed an outside
Chairman (ibid.). During April and May, staff at the Departments of Education and Science
(DES) and Health and Social Services (DHSS) cast around the names of possible chairs. None,
importantly, had any connection with IVF or ‘Education and Science’. The suggestions were
Sir Norman Lindop, an osteopath, James Sutherland, a solicitor, Lady Gillian Wagner, chair of
Dr Barnardo’s, and Mary Warnock, then senior research fellow at St Hugh’s College, Oxford
(Newton, 1982). Warnock was the preferred candidate from the outset – identified by civil
servants as ‘very well qualified for the job’ (ibid.). But these qualifications only stemmed partly
from her status as an ‘outsider’. While Warnock’s selection would have fulfilled the demand
for outside involvement with science and medicine, she also fulfilled many of the traditional
requirements for chair of a government inquiry. She had led a previous committee, was known
for her organizational skills, and was typical of the well-connected, Oxbridge educated figures
that civil servants looked to when selecting committee members – known as the ‘Great and the
Good’ (Warnock, 1988b; Hennessy, 1990).
Warnock saw the inquiry as a chance to practically engage with philosophical questions of
when human life could be said to begin, and accepted the government’s invitation in early
June (Warnock, 2004). She then worked with civil servants and Norman Fowler, the
secretary of state for Health and Social Security, to select other members. This resulted in the
appointment of seven doctors and scientists, with different religious backgrounds, and eight
individuals from other professions – including two solicitors and a court recorder, two social
workers, two managers of a health-care trust, a theologian, and the vice-president of the UK
Immigrants Advice Service. Warnock’s appointment as chair, and the fact that doctors and
scientists were outnumbered by members of other professions, met the government’s desire
for a ‘broadly based’ committee. Announcing the inquiry’s formation on 23 July 1982,
Fowler took pains to distance it from the ‘examinations already underway by medical
bodies’. Its membership, he stressed, was ‘broad-based’ and would hear from many ‘lay and
religious viewpoints’ (Fowler, 1982, p. 329).
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accountability. During their second meeting, in December 1982, they criticized representatives
from the MRC for only having one non-scientist on their inquiry, and noted that
the individual in question, the Bishop of Durham, used to be a scientist anyway. This, they
claimed, would simply increase distrust as ‘it might be seen by the public as a situation when
scientists who had an interest in this research quite naturally gave it their approval’ (Warnock
Committee, 1982). In these initial meetings, the Committee also endorsed Fowler’s demand that
opinion on IVF should be sought from a ‘wide range of interested bodies’ (DHSS correspondence,
1982). Committee secretaries were instructed to invite written or spoken evidence from over 300
organizations and individuals: from scientists such as Robert Edwards; from anti-abortion,
family planning and feminist groups; from lawyers such as Ian Kennedy; from marriage
counsellors and adoption agencies; from many university departments, including law, theology
and medicine; and from representatives of all major religious denominations (ibid.).
While Warnock’s committee was hearing evidence, media reports continued to demand
greater public scrutiny of, and influence over, IVF. An editorial in The Observer stated that
test-tube babies were ‘now a public subject’ and claimed that if scientists were allowed to
proceed unchecked, ‘then we can hardly complain at the lack of faith shown by the public
[in science]’ (Anon, 1984a, p. 18). And an editorial in the Mail on Sunday, entitled ‘why we
must ALL have a say on test tube babies’, argued that ‘the time has come for the public to be
involved in the decisions which are being made in the laboratory’ (Anon, 1984b, p. 16). At
the same time, despite the fact that her committee was not due to issue its recommendations
for 2 years, Warnock became one of the strongest supporters of external oversight herself.
In a 1983 edition of the Philosophical Quarterly, she argued her committee’s main priority
was to ensure that discussion, and even regulation, of IVF be taken, not in the private, but in
the public sphere (1983, p. 249). The only way to render IVF publicly accountable, she
claimed, was to establish a ‘system of surveillance’ that allowed it to be ‘constantly watched,
not merely by the medical profession and the research biologists, but the lay as well, the
stupid, the prejudiced, the sentimental, the religious and the moralistic’ (ibid.).
This emphasis on oversight clearly influenced the committee’s thinking. In a newspaper
interview before its report was published, Warnock admitted that the key proposal involved the
formation of a ‘monitoring body to keep all innovations and technical developments under
constant review’ (Lowry, 1984). Issued in July 1984, the report framed this authority as the
‘most urgent’ of its 64 recommendations, and stressed that it must not be ‘exclusively, or even
primarily, a medical or scientific body’. In order to ensure it would not be ‘unduly influenced’ by
professional interests, it stressed that it should incorporate a wide-ranging membership and,
crucially, ‘that the chairman must be a layperson’ (Warnock, 1985a, p. 79). Warnock justified
this proposal in the New Scientist by framing the public as increasingly empowered stakeholders
in science and medicine. When research raised a moral dilemma, she claimed,
there is no reason why scientists should be responsible by themselves for solving it y
A society in which what might or might not be done was decided solely by those
committed to the advance of knowledge would not be acceptable to those of us who
are not scientists. There are other values to be considered. Increasingly, and rightly,
people who are not experts expect, as of right, to help determine what is or is not a
tolerable society to live in. (1984, p. 36)
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to science or medicine. She argued, rather, that devolving regulatory power to outsiders
gave researchers more time to pursue their work, and that ‘many scientists want the onus
of deciding what is and what is not morally acceptable to be partially lifted from their
shoulders’ (1985b, p. 514). In the British Medical Journal, she claimed oversight acted as a
safeguard for research by showing it ‘can be regulated without being banned, that
knowledge can be pursued without being put to morally intolerable uses’. In a climate of
public and political distrust, she followed, it had become essential ‘if we are to continue, as
we must, to push back the frontiers of science’ (1988a, p. 298).
Warnock was certainly right to claim that many scientists supported external scrutiny of
IVF. A 1983 editorial in Nature had argued it would help make the procedure ‘socially
palatable’, and recommended the formation of a statutory body to ‘exert a supervisory
influence, consider difficult questions as they arise, and keep the general public informed’
(Anon, 1983b, p. 735). Following the publication of the Committee’s report, the
British Medical Journal also claimed that scientists ‘will welcome the suggestion that a
new licensing authority should be set up to regulate infertility services, monitor new
developments, and vet individual research projects’ (Anon, 1984c, p. 207). Although the
Lancet was more cautious about increased oversight, warning it must not impede research, it
begrudgingly accepted that declining faith in professional expertise and an increasing
‘consumer movement’ made it inevitable (Anon, 1986, p. 1016).
Following the publication of her committee’s report, Warnock became synonymous with
the approach increasingly labelled as ‘bioethics’ (see Figure 1). After being appointed to the
House of Lords as a cross-bench peer in 1985, she contributed two articles to a new journal
Figure 1: ‘To be or not to be?’ Illustration to a 1994 Sunday Telegraph profile of Mary Warnock, which
detailed her ‘wide and extraordinary influence’ over ethical debate in Britain (Anon, 1994). Reproduced
courtesy of Edward Collet.
Wilson
132 r 2011 The London School of Economics and Political Science 1745-8552 BioSocieties Vol. 6, 2, 121–141of Bioethics, publicly discussed the ethics of issues like IVF, gene therapy and animal
experimentation, and was appointed as the British representative on a new European
Commission on Bioethics (Warnock, 1987a,b; Jasanoff, 2005). The association was
strengthened further by Warnock’s calls for a permanent ethics committee that, as she wrote
in the British Medical Journal, would constantly monitor ‘a wide range of ethical problems,
arising in both medical practice and research’ (1988a, p. 1626). Again, she took pains to
present this as a benefit to biomedicine, claiming that research would continue to be publicly
criticized unless decision making became ‘highly visible’ (ibid.). Having been endorsed by
several MPs and biomedical journals, Warnock’s proposal was discussed at length by civil
servants at the Cabinet Office, as well as delegates at conferences sponsored by the CIBA and
Nuffield foundations (CIBA Foundation, 1989; Lock, 1990). By 1990, however, it was clear
any national committee would not have parliamentary links: due to political skepticism
toward another quasi-official body, or ‘quango’, and reluctance toward possible ministerial
interference (O’Neill, 2009). Instead, after encouragement from the molecular biologist Sir
David Weatherall, the Nuffield Foundation established an independent Council on Bioethics
in December 1990: with the former DHSS secretary Sir Patrick Nairne as chairman, and a
diverse membership comprising scientists, doctors, lawyers, philosophers, economists,
industrialists and journalists (Anon, 1991b).
The formation of a permanent bioethics council highlighted that scientists and doctors
were no longer the sole arbiters of ethical expertise in their respective fields. Following
Warnock’s appointment as chair of the government inquiry in 1982, bioethics quickly
became the norm in regulatory commissions and public debate. The marked growth and
influence of what the Guardian called the ‘ethics industry’ appeared bound to the
widespread demand for oversight of science and medicine in the 1980s. As we have seen,
politicians and public figures like Ian Kennedy endorsed it as a way ensuring public
accountability, while many doctors and scientists promoted it to colleagues as a means of
protecting research. And belief in its value was consolidated by the way that new external
arbiters, like Mary Warnock, positioned themselves as vital intermediaries between these
two views: promising to represent the public interest and legitimate research.
‘No Moral Experts’: Moral Pluralism and Critiques of the Warnock
Committee
But we must not assume that this external oversight was universally accepted. To do so
would ascribe to the ‘origin myth’ model, by parading what Cooter terms a ‘positive
narrative of moral progress’ (2000, p. 453). In fact, Warnock’s engagement with science and
medicine prompted considerable criticism; and it took 6 years for her committee’s
recommendations to be passed into law, in the 1990 Human Fertilization and Embryology
Act. This stemmed from intractable differences of opinion regarding embryo experimenta-
tion, which became apparent to Warnock as soon as her committee began to hear evidence.
Supporters and opponents of experiments on embryos both mobilized equally valid, but
incommensurable, claims to support their case. Groups like the Royal Society, the MRC and
the British Medical Association endorsed research on utilitarian grounds: claiming
experiments on small numbers of embryos were essential to overcoming the developmental
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justified at an early developmental stage, as the embryo equated to little more than a
bundle of cells and was not recognizably human (Pallott, 1983). However, as a committee
memo noted, this ran counter to the ‘substantial body of opinion’ that totally opposed any
research on embryos (Warnock Committee, 1983). Groups like LIFE, the Guild of Catholic
doctors, the Women’s Institute and the general practitioner’s association asserted that human
life began at, and deserved legal protection from, conception. Rejecting the argument that
early embryos were not recognizably human, these groups claimed that developmental
biology provided evidence for an outright ban – as it showed that ‘the genetic coding
is laid down on fertilization and [is] discernable as human on the first mitosis’ (Spencer,
1983, p. 1823).
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given its ‘broad based’ composition, similar divisions emerged
within the committee. Three members argued that embryos should never be used in research,
while others believed experiments were essential (although they could not agree whether
embryos should be created specifically for research, or where in development any cut-off
should be drawn). Warnock quickly realized there would be no way of arriving at a proposal
that satisfied all the committee, or the broader groups for which it was proxy. Instead,
as she outlined in a 1986 lecture, the solution lay ‘in the messier, less tidy business of
compromise y of attempting to come up with a satisfactory solution which, while retaining
as many of the calculated benefits to society as possible, will nevertheless offend and horrify
people as little as possible’ (1987a, p. 8). Here, for all the emphasis on its non-scientific
members, the committee fell back on the expertise of the developmental biologist Anne
McLaren – who Warnock has since identified as ‘indispensable’ (2004, p. 80). McLaren
advised the committee to adopt 14 days as a cut-off for embryo experiments. Around this
point, cells in one pole of the rudimentary embryo condense to form the ‘primitive streak’,
which then differentiates into the antecedents of the spinal cord and nervous system.
McLaren claimed that before the primitive streak formed, there was no possibility of an
embryo experiencing pain. And she argued that the primitive streak could be framed as the
beginning of individual development instead of fertilization, as it marked the last point at
which the embryo could cleave to form twins (Warnock, 2004, pp. 81–83).
McLaren’s arguments satisfied those committee members, including Warnock, who sought
to permit embryo experiments up to a specific stage in development. The committee report
subsequently recommended 14 days as the cut-off for research, presenting it as the point
in which a ‘loosely packed configuration of cells’ developed the ‘first features of the
embryo proper’ (Warnock, 1985a, pp. 58–59). But the trio who opposed experiments at any
stage of development refused to support this proposal, and set out their objections in an
appendix (ibid, pp. 90–92). This undermined Warnock’s efforts to present 14 days as an
acceptable cut-off, and provided ammunition for those groups, like LIFE, who argued
embryo experimentation was ‘not in keeping with the respect due to human life’ and
campaigned for legislation banning all research (Hiley, 1984, p. 90). For a while it appeared
that Parliament would do just this. Following a series of debates in which many MPs
and Lords criticized the 14-day limit, the Conservative politician Enoch Powell introduced
a private member’s Bill late in 1984, which, if passed, would prohibit all research on
in vitro embryos (Mulkay, 1997). This Unborn Children (Protection) Bill was only defeated
after a pro-research lobby, including Mary Warnock, distinguished the early ‘pre-embryo’
Wilson
134 r 2011 The London School of Economics and Political Science 1745-8552 BioSocieties Vol. 6, 2, 121–141from an ‘unborn child’, and warned politicians that a total ban would stifle essential
research (Warnock, 1985c).
At the same time, others attacked the 14-day proposal as too restrictive. Editorials in
Science and Nature urged the government to ‘devise more liberal legislation’, while Robert
Edwards claimed ‘many fundamental studies on differentiation, human anomalies and other
major advances may require more days in vitro’ (Edwards, 1984; Sattaur, 1984; Anon,
1984e). And the Oxford philosopher Michael Lockwood described the 14-day limit as
‘unfortunate’, suggesting that research should be permitted on embryos up to 6 weeks after
fertilization (1985, p. 187). Others, meanwhile, used the controversy to make a specific
point about the types of expertise needed for ethics committees. Another Oxford
philosopher, Richard Hare, claimed that disagreement surrounding embryo experiments
was likely ‘to go on inconclusively’ without thorough utilitarian consideration of the benefits
and harms that followed from a particular moral positions (1987, p. 71). Hare believed
philosophers had the crucial role in helping other committee members, politicians and the
public to derive ‘clear answers’ – persuading them to give reasons to support their stance, or
agree there was a better course of action. Rather damningly, however, he claimed Warnock
was content with the second best alternative, which was perhaps all she could manage.
This was to find some conclusions which the members of the committee, or as large a
majority as possible, would sign, and not bother about finding defensible reasons for
them. Since the members were fairly typical in their moral attitudes or prejudices, it
might be hoped that conclusions to which they would agree would also be acceptable
to the public. (ibid, p. 82)
Hare concluded that by not ensuring unanimity in her committee, Warnock simply ensured
that opposing groups ‘were having a field day and the public is still floundering’ (ibid, p. 88).
Responding to this criticism, and the controversy surrounding embryo research, Warnock
claimed that moral disagreement was ‘unavoidable’ as pluralist societies lacked an ‘agreed
set of principles which everyone, or the majority, or any representative person, believes
to be absolutely binding’ (1985a, p. xi). To Warnock, it followed from this that no field –
including philosophy – should dominate ethical oversight and decision making. Rebutting
Hare, and echoing Thatcher’s claim that ‘choice is the essence of ethics’, she argued that
In matters of life and death, of birth and the family, no-one is prepared to defer to
judgements made on the basis of a superior ability in philosophy. For these are
areas that are central to morality, and everyone has a right to judge for himself. Such
issues indeed lie at the heart of society; everyone not only wants to make their own
choices but are bound to do so. And this is why there cannot be moral experts. Every-
one’s choice is his own. (ibid, p. 96; cf Dowden, 1978).
With this in mind, Warnock countered that if her committee had ‘been undivided then it
would inevitably also have been unrepresentative, perhaps seen as biased’ (1985b, p. 519).
As the divisions on embryo experimentation were irreconcilable, she followed, the solution
lay not in striving for a ‘correct’ answer, but involved proposing ‘something practical,
regretted no doubt by some as too lax, by others as too strict, but something to which,
whatever their reservations, everyone would be prepared to consent’ (ibid, p. 521).
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professional expertise, Warnock claimed that simply replacing the expertise of doctors and
scientists with that of philosophers was ‘not only out of place, but totally unacceptable’
(1985a, p. 96). As she detailed throughout the 1980s and 1990s, she believed ethics
committees should provide a form of ‘corporate decision-making’ in which various pro-
fessions and interest groups formulated acceptable solutions to contentious issues (Warnock,
1992, p. 31). This line of thought has proved influential – and helps answer the vexed
question of what bioethics is. To the philosopher Onora O’Neill, an ex-member of the
Nuffield Council on Bioethics and former student of Mary Warnock:
Bioethics is not a discipline, nor even a new discipline; I doubt it will ever become a
discipline. It has become a meeting ground for a number of disciplines, discourses and
organizations concerned with ethical, legal and social questions raised by advances in
medicine, science and technology. The protagonists who debate and dispute on this
ground include patients and environmentalists, scientists and journalists, politicians
and campaigners, and representatives of an array of civic and business interests,
professions and academic disciplines. (2002, p. 1)
As Roger Brownsword notes, moreover, we should not consider moral pluralism a problem
for bioethics, but should see it as the source of its socio-political utility: providing ‘outsiders’
with the chance to broker compromises and facilitate ‘the process of practical decision-
making’ (2008, p. 29). But this state of affairs is by no means self-evident, and is rather the
product of considerable negotiation by bioethicists themselves. Here, again, lies the value of
historical studies of bioethics. Examining how figures like Warnock turned criticism of her
committee’s deliberative process into an argument for continued, interdisciplinary oversight
of biomedicine goes a long way to helping us appreciate precisely why bioethics remains
such a visible, and valued, enterprise.
Conclusions
I have argued that studying debates on reproductive medicine can help us appreciate the
demand for bioethics in Britain since the 1980s. Bioethics gained currency in this period
because it fulfilled, and linked, the ambitions of politicians, scientists and doctors, and those
figures in law and philosophy who went on to become ‘ethical experts’. The prospect of
externally policing biomedicine tallied with the Conservative desire to audit hitherto self-
regulating professions and increase their accountability to empowered ‘consumers’.
Correspondence from the DHSS and DES indicate that this extended to the appointment
of an ‘outside’ chair and a ‘broad-based’ membership for the government’s inquiry into
human fertilization and embryology.
At the same time, the political demand for external scrutiny of professions fulfilled
Warnock’s belief that philosophers should apply themselves to practical matters. And once
selected as chair of the government inquiry, she became a strong advocate of what became
known as ‘bioethics’: criticizing biomedical paternalism and extolling the benefits of
external oversight. Like Ian Kennedy, her rhetoric was not simply a reaction to the growing
calls for oversight in this period, but was fundamentally constitutive of it. This offers strong
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bioethics as much as they responded to it. This hardly comes as a surprise. As Downie
and MacNaughton have outlined, bioethics had, and continues to have, obvious allure to
philosophers looking to tackle substantive issues and play a role in shaping their culture;
and its appeal is heightened in an increasingly competitive funding climate, where research
councils prioritize practical relevance (2007, p. 32). Those who engage with bioethics
no doubt draw encouragement from the considerable benefits that Warnock and Kennedy
reaped from their early groundwork: both went on to serve on further regulatory
commissions, were honoured by the government, and remain respected authorities on the
ethics of science and medicine.
But as Downie and MacNaughton continue, bioethics does not just appeal to those
philosophers or lawyers seeking practical relevance. It also offers assurance to doctors and
scientists who, since the 1980s, are challenged to justify new technologies and practices to
politicians and patient groups. As we have seen, Warnock promised researchers that external
oversight was an essential means of insulating their work from political and public criticism.
Many doctors and scientists clearly agreed: endorsing her calls for oversight and a national
bioethics council. Indeed, by analysing the skillful way that Warnock positioned herself
as an essential broker between political and biomedical concerns, we can go a long way to
explaining the growth of bioethics in Britain. From the outset, this new form of oversight
was as concerned with legitimating research as it was with ensuring public accountability.
And this reaffirms Rosenberg’s claim that, contrary to its ‘origin myths’, bioethics is not, and
has never been, a ‘free-floating, oppositional and socially critical reform movement’ (1999,
p. 38). In Britain, as elsewhere, it was ultimately about bridging divides, not exacerbating
them: deriving workable solutions without fundamentally questioning the forms of power or
control invested in modern biomedicine.
Some predict this lack of critical edge will spell bioethics’ downfall, but I would argue
precisely the opposite (Cooter, 2004). If we see bioethics as a ‘mediating element’ between
politics, the public and science, then contemporary society provides it with fertile ground
(Rosenberg, 1999, p. 38). The biomedical sector is increasingly seen as a prized component
of the so-called ‘knowledge economy’, with politicians and private investors placing great
stock in the progress of research (Rose, 2007). And successive New Labour governments
have increased the trend toward public scrutiny and accountability in many policy areas
(Keane, 2009). This is especially the case for science and medicine: where amidst what
Franklin calls a ‘crisis of bad faith’, political and media discussion of GM crops, stem cells
and retained organs continues to prioritize external oversight and public participation in the
regulatory process (Franklin, 2003). By simultaneously providing assurance to politicians,
social groups and scientists – while continuing to generate and sustain public debate –
bioethics will no doubt remain influential for years to come.
Acknowledgements
Thanks to Professor John Pickstone for his help and advice; thanks also to Doctor Kay Elder, of
Bourne Hall Clinic, Cambridge, for providing the image of Mary Warnock. I am grateful to four
BioSocieties referees for their comments on an early draft of this article. The research on which
this article is based was funded by a Wellcome Trust fellowship in the History of Medicine.
Creating the ‘ethics industry’
137 r 2011 The London School of Economics and Political Science 1745-8552 BioSocieties Vol. 6, 2, 121–141About the Author
Duncan Wilson is a Wellcome Trust research fellow in the Centre for the History of Science,
Technology and Medicine (CHSTM) at the University of Manchester. His research looks at
the history of biomedical science and bioethics during the twentieth century, and he has
published articles on the history of tissue culture, the reorganization of academic biology
and the study of animal ‘suicide’.
References
Anon. (1924) Review of Daedalus, or Science and the Future. Nature: 113, 740.
Anon. (1972) The research of today and the ethics of tomorrow. British Medical Journal 3: 342–343.
Anon. (1975) Merrison committee: Report of inquiry. British Medical Journal 2: 183–188.
Anon. (1982a) Debate call over test tube babies. The Guardian 10 February: 2.
Anon. (1982b) A matter of origins. The Times 10 February 1982: 11.
Anon. (1983a) Research ethical committees. The Lancet 321: 1026.
Anon. (1983b) Embryology needs rules, not new laws. Nature 302: 735–744.
Anon. (1984a) Test tube babies are now a public subject. The Observer 20 May: 18.
Anon. (1984b) Why we must ALL have a say on test tube babies. The Mail on Sunday 20 May: 16.
Anon. (1984c) A welcome report. British Medical Journal 249: 207–208.
Anon. (1984d) Confused comment on Warnock. Nature 312: 389.
Anon. (1986) Who’s for bioethics committees? The Lancet 327: 1016.
Anon. (1991a) To the heart of a clinical matter. The Guardian 17 April; 21.
Anon. (1991b) Nuffield council on bioethics. The Times 24 July: 17.
Anon. (1994) To be or not to be? Profile: Mary Warnock. Sunday Telegraph, 2 January: 12.
Armstrong, E.M. (2007) Placing bioethics historically. In: B.K. Rothman, E.M. Armstrong and R. Tiger (eds.)
Advances in Medical Sociology, Volume 9: Bioethical Issues, Sociological Perspectives. Oxford: JAI Press,
pp. 1–7.
Ashcroft, R. (2004) Bioethics and conflicts of interest. Studies in History and Philosophy of the Biological and
Biomedical Sciences 35: 155–165.
Ashcroft, R. and Dixon-Woods, M. (2008) Regulation and the social licence for medical research. Medical
Health Care and Philosophy 11: 381–391.
Ayer, A.J. (1954) Philosophical Essays. London: Macmillan.
Bartlett, S. (2000) The development of teacher appraisal: A recent history. British Journal of Educational
Studies 48: 24–37.
Belkin, G. (2004) Moving beyond bioethics: History and the search for medical humanism. Perspectives in
Biology and Medicine 47: 372–385.
Brown, A. (2003) The practical philosopher. The Guardian 19 July: 20.
Brownsword, R. (2008) Bioethics: Bridging from morality to law? In: M. Freeman (ed.) Law and Bioethics.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 12–31.
Campbell, A. (1982) Parliamentary Debates: House of Lords. London: HMSO: 432, 9 July, p. 1001.
Campbell, A. (2009) Telephone interview with the author. University of Manchester, 26 June.
CIBA Foundation. (1989) Medical Scientific Advance: Its Challenge to Society. London: The CIBA
Foundation.
Cooter, R. (2000) The ethical body. In: R. Cooter and J.V. Pickstone (eds.) Companion to Medicine in the
Twentieth Century. London: Routledge, pp. 451–469.
Cooter, R. (2004) Keywords in the history of medicine: Bioethics. The Lancet 364: 1749.
Culliton, B.J. and Waterfall, W.K. (1978) Flowering of American bioethics. British Medical Journal 2:
1270–1271.
DHSS Correspondence to University Grants Committee. (1982) Correspondence held at national archives.
File FD7/2307.
Dowden, R. (1978) The Thatcher philosophy. Catholic Herald, 22 December: 1.
Wilson
138 r 2011 The London School of Economics and Political Science 1745-8552 BioSocieties Vol. 6, 2, 121–141Downie, R.S. and MacNaughton, J. (2007) Bioethics and the Humanities: Attitudes and Perceptions. Oxford:
Routledge.
Dunstan, R.G. (1974) The Artifice of Ethics. London: SCM Press.
Edwards, R.G. (1974) Fertilization of human eggs in vitro: Morals, ethics and the law. Quarterly Review of
Biology 49: 3–26.
Edwards, R.G., Bavister, B.D. and Steptoe, P.C. (1969) Early stages of fertilization in vitro of human oocytes
matured in vitro. Nature 221: 632–635.
Edwards, R.G. (1984) Correspondence to Box, J.E. Medical Research Council, National Archives.
Evans, J.H. (2002) Playing God: Human Genetic Engineering and the Rationalization of Public Bioethical
Debate. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Fowler, N. (1982) Parliamentary Debates: House of Commons. London: HMSO: 159, 23 July, p. 329.
Fox, R.C. and Swazey, J.P. (2008) Observing Bioethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Franklin, S. (2003) Ethical biocapital: New strategies of cell culture. In: S. Franklin and M. Lock (eds.)
Remaking Life and Death: Toward an Anthropology of the Biosciences. Santa Fe, NM and Oxford: School
of American Research Press, pp. 97–129.
Fukuyama, F. (2002) Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution. London: Profile
Books.
Gillon, R. (1984) Britain: The Public Gets Involved. Hastings Center Report, 16–17 December.
Hadley, K. (1984) Tinkering with life. The Daily Express 11 June: 10.
Haldane, J.B.S. (1924) Daedalus, or Science and the Future. London: Kegan Paul & Co.
Hare, R.M. (1987) In vitro fertilization and the Warnock report. In: R. Chadwick (ed.) Ethics, Reproduction
and Genetic Control. London: Croom Helm, pp. 71–93.
Harris, J. (2001) Introduction: The scope and importance of bioethics. In: J. Harris (ed.) Bioethics. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Hedgecoe, A. (2009) ‘A form of practical machinery’: The origins of research ethics committees in the UK,
1967–1972. Medical History 53: 331–350.
Hennessy, P. (1990) Whitehall. London: Fontana Press.
Hiley, M. (1984) Mary Warnock’s brave new world. The Lancet 322: 290.
Jacob, J.M. (1991) Lawyers go to hospital. Public Law: 255–281.
Jasanoff, S. (2005) Designs on Nature: Science and Democracy in Europe and the United States. Princeton,
NJ and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
Jonsen, A. (1998) The Birth of Bioethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Keane, J. (2009) The Life and Death of Democracy. London: Simon and Schuster.
Kennedy, I. (1981a) The Unmasking of Medicine. London: Allen and Unwin.
Kennedy, I. (1981b) The 1980 Reith lectures – Some reactions. Journal of Medical Ethics 7: 202–211.
Kennedy, I. (1982) Ethical guidelines on fertilization. The Times, The Times 11 February: 17.
Kleinman, A. (1999) Moral experience and ethical reflection: Can ethnography reconcile them? A quandry for
the ‘New Bioethics’. Daedalus 128: 69–99.
Lawson, N. (1980) The New Conservatism. London: Centre for Policy Studies.
Lock, S. (1990) Towards a national bioethics committee. British Medical Journal 300: 1149–1150.
Lockwood, M. (1985) The Warnock report: A philosophical appraisal. In: M. Lockwood (ed.) Moral
Dilemmas in Modern Medicine. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 115–187.
Lopez, J. (2004) How sociology can save bioethics y maybe. Sociology of Health and Illness 26: 875–896.
Lowe, R. (2007) The Death of Progressive Education: How Teachers Lost Control of the Classroom. London:
Routledge.
Lowry, S. (1984) Birth of a new ethic. Newspaper clipping held at Archives and Manuscripts, Wellcome Trust
Library for History of Medicine. File number PP/MLV/C/23/1/6.
Mulkay, M. (1997) The Embryo Research Debate: Science and the Politics of Reproduction. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Munro, E. (2004) The impact of audit on social work practice. LSE Research Online, http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/
523/1/Audit-SocialWork_05.pdf.
Newton, K. and Department of Science and Education, to Vickers, D., Medical Research Council (1982)
Correspondence held at National Archives. File FD7/2307, 24 May.
Norton, P. and Department of Education and Science, to Noble, D., Medical Research Council (1982)
Correspondence held at National Archives. File FD7/2307, 13 April.
Creating the ‘ethics industry’
139 r 2011 The London School of Economics and Political Science 1745-8552 BioSocieties Vol. 6, 2, 121–141O’Neill, O. (2002) Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
O’Neill, O. (2009) Interview with the author. The British Academy, 20 April.
Pallott, P. (1983) Towards a brave new world. The Daily Telegraph 27 April: 11.
Pigden, C.R. (2003) Bertrand Russell: Moral philosopher or unphilosophical moralist? In: N. Griffin (ed.) The
Cambridge Companion to Bertrand Russell. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 475–505.
Potter, V.R. (1970) Bioethics, the science of survival. Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 14: 127–153.
Power, M. (1997) The Audit Society: The Rituals of Verification. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Reynolds, M. and Badford, R. (1982) Test tube baby doctor warned off. The Daily Mirror 28 September 7.
Robertson, G. (1982) The law and test tube babies. The Observer 7 February: 8.
Rose, N. (1993) Government, authority and expertise in advanced liberalism. Economy and Society 22:
283–299.
Rose, N. (1999) Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rose, N. (2007) The Politics of Life Itself: Biomedicine, Power and Subjectivity in the Twenty-First Century.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Rosenberg, C.E. (1999) Meanings, policies, and medicine: On the bioethical enterprise and history. Daedalus
128: 27–46.
Salter, B. (2000) Medical Regulation and Public Trust. London: King’s Fund Publishing.
Salter, B. (2004) Cultural Biopolitics, Bioethics and the Moral Economy. Global Biopolitics Research Group,
Working Paper No. 1, http://www.york.ac.uk/res/sci/projects/res340250001salter.htm.
Salter, B. and Jones, M. (2005) Biobanks and bioethics: The politics of legitimation. Journal of European
Public Policy 12: 710–732.
Sattaur, O. (1984) New conception threatened by old morality. New Scientist 27 September: 12–17.
Spencer, S.J.G. (1983) Human in vitro fertilization and embryo replacement and transfer. British Medical
Journal 286: 1822–1823.
Stevens, T. (2000) Bioethics in America: Origins and Cultural Politics. Baltimore, MD and London: Johns
Hopkins University Press.
Strathern, M. (2000) Audit Cultures: Anthropological Studies in Accountability, Ethics and the Academy.
London: Routledge.
Strangeways, T.S.P. (1926) Tissue culture lectures: Lecture one. Held at the Wellcome Trust Library for the
History of Medicine, Archives and Manuscripts: SA/SRL/A.27.
Toulmin, S. (1982) How medicine saved the life of ethics. Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 25: 736–750.
Tucker, A. (1978) The brave new world of test tube babies. The Guardian 27 July: 11.
Turney, J. (1997) Frankenstein’s Footsteps: Science, Genetics and Popular Culture. New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press.
Warnock Committee. (1982) Meeting minutes. Held at the National Archives, FD7/2307, 14 December.
Warnock Committee. (1983) Experiments on embryos: Key questions. Held at the National Archives,
FD7/2307.
Warnock, M. (1960) Ethics Since 1900, 1st edn. London: Oxford University Press.
Warnock, M. (1978) Ethics Since 1900, 3rd edn. London: Oxford University Press.
Warnock, M. (1983) In vitro fertilization: The ethical issues (II). The Philosophical Quarterly 33: 238–249.
Warnock, M. (1984) Scientific research must have a moral basis. New Scientist 15 November: 36.
Warnock, M. (1985a) A Question of Life: The Warnock Report on Human Fertilisation and Embryology.
London: Basil Blackwell.
Warnock, M. (1985b) Moral thinking and government policy. The Millbank Memorial Fund Quarterly.
Health and Society 63: 504–522.
Warnock, M. (1985c) Totally wrong. The Times 30 May: 12.
Warnock, M. (1987a) Do human cells have rights? Bioethics 1: 1–14.
Warnock, M. (1987b) The good of the child. Bioethics 1: 141–155.
Warnock, M. (1988a) A national ethics committee. British Medical Journal 297: 1626–1627.
Warnock, M. (1988b) Government commissions. In: U. Bertazzoni, P. Fasella, A. Klepsch and P. Lange (eds.)
Human Embryos and Research: Proceedings of the European Bioethics Conference in Mainz, 7–9
November. Frankfurt and New York: Campus Verlag, pp. 159–169.
Warnock, M. (1992) Embryo therapy: The philosopher’s role in public debate. In: D.R. Bromham,
M.E. Dalton and P.J.R. Millican (eds.) Ethics in Reproductive Medicine. London: Springer Verlag,
pp. 21–31.
Warnock, M. (2000) A Memoir: People and Places. London: Duckworth.
Wilson
140 r 2011 The London School of Economics and Political Science 1745-8552 BioSocieties Vol. 6, 2, 121–141Warnock, M. (2004) Nature and Morality: Recollections of a Philosopher in Public Life. London: Continuum.
Warnock, M. (2009) Interview with the author. House of Lords, 27 January.
Werskey, G. (2007) The Marxist critique of capitalist science: A history in three movements. Science as
Culture 16: 397–461.
Whong-Barr, M. (2003) Clinical ethics teaching in Britain: A history of the London Medical Group. New
Review of Bioethics 1: 73–84.
Williams, P. and Stevens, G. (1982) What now for test tube babies? New Scientist 4 February: 312–316.
Wilson, D. (2005) The early history of tissue culture in Britain: The interwar years. Social History of Medicine
18: 225–243.
Wolstenholme, G. and Fitzsimmons, D.W. (eds.) (1973) The Law and Ethics of AID and Embryo Transfer.
London and New York: Elsevier.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivative Works 3.0 Unported License. To view a copy of this license, visit
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/
Creating the ‘ethics industry’
141 r 2011 The London School of Economics and Political Science 1745-8552 BioSocieties Vol. 6, 2, 121–141